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Undergraduate and graduate students in finance courses made probabilistic 
forecasts of the quarterly changes in the stock prices and earnings of publicly 
traded companies. Consistent with previous findings (Stael von Holstein, 
1972), the overall accuracy of both price and earnings forecasts was very 
modest; subjects would have been more accurate had they predicted that price 
changes were equally likely to fall into any of the specified ranges. Also con- 
sistent with earlier suggestions of “inverted” expertise effects, undergraduate 
subjects were more accurate than graduate subjects. Decompositional analy- 
ses of subjects’ judgments were consistent with the hypothesis that graduate 
students’ relatively poor accuracy was affected by their greater tendency to 
report forecasts that varied from one stock to the next instead of the same 
forecast for every one. It is argued that the most plausible explanation is that 
the graduate subjects responded to cues they thought were predictive, but 
which actually were not. However, it cannot be ruled out completely that the 
graduate subjects attended to truly predictive cues, but were simply unable to 
use them appropriately. 8 1991 academic PESS, 1~. 
In the early 197Os, St&l von Holstein (1972) performed an experiment 
concerning the stock market. He focused on the accuracy of stock price 
predictions. For each of 12 stocks, subjects made probabilistic forecasts 
that price changes over successive 2-week periods would fall into five 
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specified intervals which partitioned the continuum. The intervals were 
defined by cut-points at -3%, - l%, + l%, and +3%. For instance, on 
a given occasion, the subject might report probability pi = .30 that Stock 
X would experience a fall in price of 3% or more, probability p2 = .25 that 
the price change would be a decline of 1%3%, probability p3 = .20 of a 
change somewhere between a decline of 1% and an increase of l%, and so 
forth, with the constraint that the probability judgments for all five inter- 
vals sum to 1.0. Stael von Holstein’s primary aim was training. Every 2 
weeks, he gave his subjects feedback about their accuracy to that point in 
the study. This feedback was generated by a quadratic scoring rule equiv- 
alent to the probability score for multiple events, as described by Yates 
(1988). Apparently, it was hoped that scoring rule feedback would im- 
prove forecasting performance. 
The results of Stael von Holstein’s experiment were surprising. First of 
all, the training was ineffective. Scoring rule feedback yielded virtually no 
improvement in accuracy over the 20 weeks the experiment lasted. Sec- 
ond, the subjects’ predictions were remarkably inaccurate. For example, 
only 3 of the 72 subjects’ average scores were better than that of a uniform 
forecaster. A “uniform forecaster” is an individual who consistently be- 
haves as if all the specified possibilities are equally likely. So a uniform 
forecaster would have reported a 20% chance that the actual price change 
for every stock would fall into each of the five ranges described by Stael 
von Holstein. Third, there was some evidence that the relationship be- 
tween accuracy and expertise is almost the inverse of what many people 
would expect. The rank ordering of subject groups, in terms of accuracy, 
was: statisticians > stock market experts > university business students 
> university business teachers > bankers. 
In the present research, we were not concerned with feedback training. 
Instead, we addressed three additional fundamental issues raised by Stael 
von Holstein’s results. First, we set out to test the reliability of the pre- 
vious findings on overall accuracy. Could probability judgments about 
securities realZy be as bad as the results suggested? As Stael von Holstein 
noted, it was plausible that certain aspects of his design might have de- 
graded his subjects’ performance, e.g., the 2-week forecasting horizon, 
which is apparently much shorter than customary for professional fore- 
casters. Also, stock prices might be inherently an especially difficult 
quantity to predict. Perhaps judgments about other financial aspects of 
target companies, e.g., their earnings, would be better. Our second ob- 
jective was to verify the suggested inverse expertise-accuracy relation- 
ship: Do novices indeed make financial forecasts better than more knowl- 
edgeable individuals? Finally, assuming that they did replicate, we sought 
explanations for the previous results: Why should security forecasts be so 
poor? And why should naive forecasters sometimes outperform sophis- 
ticated ones? 
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The conceptual framework which guided the study is illustrated in the 
panels of Fig. 1, which closely resemble lens model diagrams (Hammond, 
1966). In our study, we examined the forecasting behavior of undergrad- 
uate and graduate finance students. We regarded the former as “novices” 
and the latter as “semi-experts.” First consider Fig. l(a), which depicts 
the situation we would anticipate for semi-experts. The actual price of a 
stock is indicated on the left. The individual’s probabilistic forecast of 
that price is represented on the right as P’ (Price). The actual price is 
shown to be related to some collection of relevant cues, only a few of 
which will capture the forecaster’s attention. On the other hand, semi- 
experts’ judgments can be expected to be heavily affected by a host of 
irrelevant cues-signs the forecaster believes are predictive of price ac- 
tivity, but which really are not. This expectation is a generalization from 
other contexts. One such domain is medicine, where it is found that 
experienced physicians’ diagnoses are consistently affected by signs and 
symptoms that have no reliable statistical relationships to patients’ actual 
medical conditions (e.g., Poses, Cebul, Collins, & Fager, 1985). Similar 
effects have been observed among agricultural experts (Gaeth & Shan- 
teau, 1984). Thus, as suggested at the top of Fig. I(a), the relationship 
between actual prices and the semi-expert’s forecasts should be very 
poor. 
Now consider Fig. l(b), which characterizes our view of how a naive 
subject can be expected to approach the task of predicting stock prices. 
As a novice, this individual knows little, and readily acknowledges this 
ignorance. Accordingly, he or she pays attention to few if any cues- 
relevant or irrelevant-when making forecasts. This implies judgments 
that are essentially constant, from one case to the next. For instance, for 
lack of any basis for doing otherwise, the novice might indicate that the 
probability of each stock increasing in price is his or her estimate of the 
percentage of all stock prices that increase during the first quarter of a 
year. Since such constant forecasts cannot covary with actual price 
changes, their accuracy is severely limited. Accuracy might suffer even 
further to the extent that the particular constant forecasts that are chosen 
are far from the pertinent base rates. On the other hand, constant fore- 
casts enjoy the advantage of all conservative predictions. That is, as long 
as they are in the ballpark of the base rates, on average they are unlikely 
to be in error dramatically. 
There is considerable evidence in the economic literature that stock 
prices are extremely difficult to anticipate. In fact, analyses have often 
indicated that stock price movements resemble a “random walk,” with 
price changes in time period t = T being essentially independent of 
changes in periods t < T (e.g., Fama, 1965; Roberts, 1959). There have 
been demonstrations that this phenomenon is consistent with the hypoth- 
esis that the stock market is “efficient.” That is, virtually instanta- 
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FIG. 1. Diagrammatic representation of the stock price forecasting situation: (a) For 
semi-experts, e.g., graduate students, (b) for novices, e.g., undergraduates. 
neously, stock prices fully reflect all publicly available information about 
the companies offering those stocks (e.g., Samuelson, 1%5). This is 
brought about by the aggregate actions of thousands of stock traders, 
whose purchases affect the demand for a stock and hence its price. Of 
course, this does not imply that no one can make good price forecasts. As 
an extreme counter-example, consider the case of individuals trading with 
inside information. 
We hypothesized that forecasting firms’ earnings per share would be 
easier than predicting their share prices. The price of a company’s stock 
is largely a reflection of traders’ expectations. These in turn are buffeted 
by a multitude of forces, many of which are unknowable, volatile, and 
outside the company’s control, e.g., general market strength, rumors, and 
traders’ beliefs about what other traders will do. In contrast, how much 
money a company makes is more directly determined by its own charac- 
teristics and actions (Lorie, Dodd, & Kimpton, 1985). Related to this 
argument is the fact that, when professional security analysts forecast a 
stock price, a major consideration that is taken into account is the firm’s 
prospective earnings, model-based forecasts of which are published on a 
regular and frequent basis. But importantly, this is not the sole consider- 
64 YATES, MCDANIEL, AND BROWN 
ation professionals use in predicting stock prices. Thus, the pervasive 
inaccuracy Stael von Holstein observed in probabilistic stock price fore- 
casts should be less extensive for earnings forecasts. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
All the subjects in the study were students. They were recruited 
through announcements in undergraduate and graduate finance classes at 
the University of Michigan Business School. Several inducements were 
offered to potential participants: (a) The opportunity to practice and eval- 
uate their forecasting skills; (b) the chance to learn about probabilistic 
forecasting accuracy analysis; and (c) base and bonus monetary payment. 
Of the 31 individuals who eventually completed the study, 14 were un- 
dergraduate business administration majors and 17 were graduate stu- 
dents in business. of the latter, all but one was studying for the MBA 
degree; the remaining participant was a Ph.D. student. The resulting two 
groups of “novices” and “semi-experts” were comparable in size to 
Stat1 von Holstein’s (1972) subject groups. 
Procedure 
Each subject participated in an instruction and practice session. The 
subject was told that the task was to make probabilistic forecasts of the 
per-share stock prices and earnings of 31 companies listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange for the first quarter of 1986, which had begun 3 to 
4 weeks previously. The companies had been randomly selected from 
those whose fiscal years end on December 3 1. The experimenter and the 
instruction booklet indicated that forecasts were to be made for percent- 
age changes that might fall into six intervals which partitioned the con- 
tinuum. The following hypothetical completed response form is the one 
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In the case of prices, each forecast was for the change from December 3 1 
to March 31. Earnings are known to exhibit seasonal fluctuations. Thus, 
earnings forecasts were for changes from the first quarter in the previous 
year. 
Every subject was provided with a folder which contained not only 
written instructions and response sheets, but background information 
about each of the target companies as well. This information included the 
name of the company, its industry, and its gross revenues for the most 
recent fiscal year available. The information sheet for a given company 
also listed its closing share price on the last day of each of the preceding 
eight quarters. In addition, it reported the earnings per share for each of 
those quarters, except the immediately preceding one, since these had not 
yet been published. 
Subjects were told that each participant in the study would receive a 
token base payment of $5. The subject was also informed that an “accu- 
racy score” would be computed for his or her forecasts. This score was 
in fact a linear transformation of the probability score for multiple events 
(Yates, 1988). It was emphasized that this score is “proper” (Winkler & 
Murphy, 1968). The printed instructions and the experimenter explained 
what this implies. That is, it was in the subject’s best interests to report 
his or her true opinion about the probability of each price or earnings 
change, i.e., to avoid hedging. The subjects were promised a written 
report of the results of the study. The report would include an explanation 
of the scoring rule and the decompositional analysis applied to his or her 
judgments (see Yates, 1988, and the Results and Discussion section be- 
low). It would also include a ranked listing of all the participants’ accu- 
racy scores for both price and earnings forecasts, identified by codes. To 
gauge his or her own performance relative to the group, a given subject’s 
report would indicate his or her code number. Finally, to provide a per- 
formance incentive and to reinforce the effect of the accuracy score’s 
properness, subjects were told that the participant with the best combined 
accuracy score for price and earnings forecasts would receive a bonus of 
$30. The second, third, fourth, and fifth best forecasters were to receive 
bonuses of $20, $15, $10, and $5, respectively. 
Subjects were allowed to take all the experimental materials home with 
them. To simulate naturalistic forecasting as well as possible, subjects 
were told that they were free to consult any information or individual they 
desired, other than another participant in the study. After they finished 
the forecasting task, subjects were to complete a postexperimental ques- 
tionnaire. This instrument asked the subject to indicate his or her field of 
study, year in school, number of previous and current finance courses, 
and work experience related to finance. It also asked the subject to de- 
scribe the sources consulted and the forecasting strategies used, to report 
the amount of time spent on the project, and to rate separately the diffi- 
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culty of the price and earnings forecasting tasks. Subjects were given a 
deadline of 10 days to complete their assignments. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Subject Group Characteristics 
As expected, the undergraduate subjects had taken fewer finance 
classes than their graduate counterparts, medians of three and five 
classes, respectively. Also, whereas only three of the 14 undergraduates 
(21.4%) reported at least some work experience related to finance, 10 of 
the 17 graduates did (58.8%). With respect to the forecasting exercises 
themselves, it is notable that there were no reliable group differences in 
the amount of time subjects reported spending and the rated difficulty of 
the tasks. Besides the information supplied by the experimenter, the ma- 
jor sources of company information the subjects consulted could be 
placed into three categories: (a) periodicals such as The Wall Street Jour- 
nal, (b) Standard & Poor’s stock reports, and (c) The Value Line Znvest- 
ment Survey. However, although only four of the 14 undergraduate sub- 
jects (28.6%) relied on two or more sources, 10 of the 17 graduate sub- 
jects did (58.8%). 
Price Forecasts 
Overall accuracy. The overall accuracy of subjects’ forecasts was mea- 
sured by the probability score for multiple events (Yates, 1988). This is a 
form of the quadratic scoring rule discussed by Brier (1950). It was also 
used by Stael von Holstein (1972) in his study of stock price forecasts. 
The scoring procedure can be described as follows. 
For each stock, the subject reported a forecast vector f = cfi,&,&,f& 
fs, fs), where fk denotes a probabilistic forecast that the stock’s price 
change will lie within interval Zk, k = 1, . . ., 6, and where the intervals 
are those described in the procedure section. For each interval, there is an 
outcome index function dk, which assumes the value 1 if the actual price 
change falls within that interval and the value 0 if it does not. Thus, we 
can also speak of an outcome index vector d = (dl, d,, d3, d.,, d,, d6), 
defined in the obvious fashion. Intuitively, the outcome index can be seen 
as the forecast reported by a clairvoyant. A mortal forecaster’s predic- 
tions are considered accurate to the extent that they approximate the 
outcome index. The “probability score for multiple events” is the scalar 
product of the difference between the forecast and outcome index vec- 
tors: 
PSM(f,d) = (f - d)(f - d)r = i vi, - Q2, 
k=l 
(1) 
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where , in the present case, K = 6. PSM ranges between 0 and 2. Clearly, 
the forecaster’s aim should be to minimize its value. The mean value of 
the probability score over a given number of forecasting occasions 
(FM), provides a sense of the forecaster’s characteristic accuracy level. 
The first section of Table 1 indicates that the undergraduate subjects’ 
price forecasts were significantly more accurate than those of their grad- 
uate counterparts. (All tests of accuracy statistics are nonparametric 
since the sampling distributions of these statistics are unknown.) How- 
ever, none of the subjects was very accurate in absolute terms. This is 
most easily appreciated when their performance is compared to that of 
several hypothetical constant forecasters, who are often used as stan- 
dards of comparison. Various measures for these forecasters are con- 
tained in Table 1 also. 
The first standard is provided by a “uniform forecaster” who, as indi- 
cated previously, consistently reports that all of the specified events in a 
given situation are equally likely to occur. Thus, in the present situation, 
a uniform forecaster would assign probability !4 = .167 to each of the six 
TABLE 1 
MEDIAN VALUES AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS (p) FOR VAFUOUS ACCURACY MEASURES 
FOR UNDERG~DUATE (CrG) AND GRADUATE (GR) SUBJECTS PRICE (P) AND EARNINGS 
(E) FORECASTS, WITH CORRESPONDING MEASURES FOR UNIFORM (U), HISTORICAL (H), 
AND BASE RATE (B) FORECASTERS 
p: VG 
Measure Target VG GR vs GR” V H B 
?SU: Prices 1.1538 1.1968 c.05 .8334 .7283 s847 
Overall act. Earnings 1.1000 1.2471 <.05 .8331 .7826 .7555 
p: P vs Eb <.05 - - - - - 
Calib. index: Prices .3611 .3804 ns .2487 .1436 .OMlO 
Calibration Earnings .1149 .1285 ns .0776 .0271 .OOOO 
p: P vs E <.OOOl <.oOOl - - - - 
Mean slope: Prices - .0198 -.0163 ns .OOOO .OOOO .oooO 
Covariation Earnings - .0141 - .0255 ns .OOOO .OOOO 4000 
p: P vs E 
Scat. index: Prices .:96 .%I8 
- - - - 
<.05 .m .oocm .oooo 
Poor cues/ Earnings .I490 .2297 <.05 .oooo .moo .oooo 
inconsist. p: P vs E ns <.05 - - - - 
Profile var.: Prices .0381 .0627 <.05 .oooo JO24 .0414 
Discrep. from Earnings .0335 .0653 <.05 .oooo .02a9 .0129 
uniform p: P vs E <.Ol <.05 - - - - 
Skill index: Prices .5736 .6120 <.05 .2487 .1436 .OOOO 
Overall, Earnings .3471 .4957 <.05 .0776 .0271 .OOOO 
corrected p: P vs E <.OOOl <.OOOl - - - - 
0 Mann-Whitney U test, one-tailed, VG predicted to be better. 
b Median test, one-tailed, E predicted to be better. 
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intervals distinguished for subjects. The dotted line labelled “U” drawn 
through Fig. 2(a) illustrates graphically the distribution of those forecasts 
across all intervals. A second standard is provided by a “historical 
forecaster.” This individual determines the relative frequency with which 
a given focal event has been noted to occur in the past. The historical 
forecaster then makes a forecast identical to that historical relative fre- 
a MEAN PROBABILISTIC FORECAST 
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FIG. 2. (a) Mean price change forecasts for a unifom forecaster (U), a historical fore- 
caster (H), a base rate forecaster (B), and the undergraduate (UC) and graduate (CR) 
subjects; (b) probability scores (F) for uniform, historical, and base rate forecasters as 
standards and for the undergraduate and graduate subjects. 
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quency. For instance, if a subject chose to do so, he or she would have 
found that, in the background information provided about all the target 
companies, quarterly price gains more than 10% occurred about 28% of 
the time. Acting as a historical forecaster, for every company, that sub- 
ject would have indicated a 28% chance of a price rise greater than 10%. 
The open bars in Fig. 2(a) describe the entire distribution of historical 
forecasts. A “base rate forecaster” provides a third important standard. 
This fictional forecaster can somehow anticipate the actual relative fre- 
quency, i.e., the base rate, with which a future event actually does occur. 
In the first quarter of 1986, about 61% of the 31 stocks subjects were 
asked to consider rose in price more than 10%. Accordingly, a base rate 
forecaster would have always reported a probabilistic forecast of .61 for 
a price increase over 10%. The black filled bars in Fig. 2(a) represent the 
complete distribution of base rate forecasts in this study. 
It is easy to show that, regardless of what price changes might have 
occurred in the present study, a uniform forecaster was guaranteed to 
earn a mean probability score of PSM = .8334.’ As illustrated in Fig. 2(b), 
the accuracy of both the undergraduate and graduate subjects fell far 
short of that standard. Using decompositions of m into various accu- 
racy components, it is straightforward to demonstrate that, using the 
previous price information provided in subjects’ background folders, a 
historical forecaster would have earned a mean probability score of .7283. 
Similarly, we can show that a base rate forecaster would have done even 
better, earning a score of PSM = .5!347. As also shown in Fig. 2(b), both 
subject groups fell far short of the standards set by the historical and base 
rate forecasters. 
An analysis note: Accuracy decomposition. Probabilistic forecasting 
accuracy is not a unitary construct. On the contrary, overall accuracy 
measures can be decomposed into several distinct elements (e.g., Mur- 
phy, 1972a, 1972b, 1973; Sanders, 1%3). Such decompositions then point 
toward explanations of puzzling accuracy phenomena, e.g., the present 
subjects’ pervasive inaccuracy and the greater forecasting success by the 
less experienced subjects. In general, accuracy decompositions can be 
conceptualized as follows: 
Accuracy = AUncontrollable Factors; Controllable Factors) (2) 
That is, overall accuracy is a function of aspects of the forecasting task 
that are independent of the forecaster’s actions as well as others which 
indeed are determined by what the forecaster does. 
’ Our subjects could not achieve precisely this value because they reported judgments to 
only the nearest whole percentage point. 
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In the case of the covariance decomposition of PSM as an overall 
accuracy measure, the conceptual partition is this (Yates, 1982, 1988): 
Accuracy = AUncontrollable: Base Rate; Controllable: Calibration, 
Covariation, Scatter) (3) 
For instance, the base rate with which stock prices rise or fall is com- 
pletely outside the forecaster’s control. Nevertheless, it has an effect on 
his or her probability score. Thus, in interpreting how good or bad the 
forecaster’s performance is, that effect should be removed. Or, equiva- 
lently, attention should be focused on those accuracy dimensions that are 
subject to the forecaster’s influence-calibration, the covariation of 
prices and judgments, and forecast scatter. The meanings of these con- 
structs are described in the next three subsections, which present the 
results of the decomposition analysis of subjects’ price forecasts. More 
complete detail about the relevant statistics is provided by Yates (1988). 
Calibration. Probabilistic forecasts are said to be well-calibrated to the 
extent that the average forecast matches the observed base rate. For 
example, suppose that, on each of 100 occasions, an analyst reports a 
forecast that the given stock will fall in price between 5% and lO%, and 
that the average of such forecasts is .20. Then, if the analyst’s forecasts 
are perfectly calibrated, the prices for exactly 20 of the 100 stocks in fact 
will experience declines of W&10%. The patterned bars in Fig. 2(a) show 
the mean forecasts by the undergraduate and graduate subjects for each 
range of potential price changes. A comparison of those bars to the black 
base rate bars suggests that the subjects’ calibration was not especially 
good. Perhaps more importantly, however, note that the bars for the 
undergraduate and graduate subjects differ only slightly from each other. 
This indicates that the calibration of the groups was comparable. Thus, 
differences in calibration cannot account for the groups’ differences in 
overall accuracy. 
The degree of calibration present in a collection of forecasts can be 
characterized numerically by the “calibration index,” defined as follows: 
(4) 
k=l 
where the notational conventions are as before, andfk and & are the mean 
forecast and base rate for Interval k, respectively. The calibration index 
section of Table 1 con&ns the previous impression that, on average, the 
calibration of the undergraduate and graduate subjects’ forecasts was 
essentially the same. 
Covariation. Suppose a forecaster’s opinions are good. Then high prob- 
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abilities should be assigned to a given price change interval on those 
occasions when the actual price changes in fact do fall within that inter- 
val, and low probabilities should be reported when the changes fall out- 
side that interval. That is, the forecasts should be strongly related to the 
occurrences of eventual individual price changes. This aspect of judgment 
accuracy is embodied in the covariation between forecasts and outcome 
indexes. For a given Interval k, the statistical covariance of these quan- 
tities is given by 
Cov(f,& = Slope,Var(dJ, (5) 
where 
Slopek = Vik - hk> (6) 
is the difference in the mean forecasts for a price change falling into 
Interval k when that actually does occur pi& and when it does not (fbJ, 
and 
Var(d,) = &(I - ;ik> (7) 
is the variance of the outcome index dk for that interval. Clearly, the slope 
is the covariance contributor that is under the forecaster’s control and is 
thus of primary interest. Accordingly, the mean value of the slope across 
all intervals, 
K 
Mean Slope = (l/K) c Slope&, 
k=l 
(8) 
serves as a good summary of the forecaster’s covariation skills. 
The mean slope section of Table 1 indicates that the abilities of the 
undergraduate and graduate subjects to vary their forecasts with actual 
price changes did not differ from each other reliably. Thus, like calibra- 
tion, covariation differences cannot explain the overall accuracy advan- 
tage exhibited by the undergraduates. It is also of some interest that the 
covariation skills of both groups were essentially nil, with the mean slope 
statistics being nonsignificantly different from zero, although they were 
slightly negative. 
Scafter. In a sense, the converse of skill at covarying one’s forecasts 
with actual occurrences is the ability to avoid varying one’s predictions 
independently of those occurrences. Such independent variation is re- 
ferred to as “scatter.” It is most plausibly due to either or both of two 
factors. First, the forecaster might make predictions on the basis of weak 
cues, information that is thought to be reliably related to prices, for in- 
stance, but which actually is not. Alternatively, the forecaster might be 
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inconsistent in responding to whatever information he or she does take 
into account, e.g., sometimes making optimistic predictions on the basis 
of a cue and at other times pessimistic forecasts from the same cue. 
The scatter that is present in forecasts of price changes in Interval k is 
represented numerically by the scatter index: 
SZk = WMN,kVarV;k) + %kVW&)l, (9) 
where Var(f,,J is the conditional variance of the Nlk forecasts for a price 
change falling into Interval k when that actually occurred, and Var&) is 
the corresponding conditional variance of such judgments for the NOk 
occasions when it did not occur, N = N,, + NOk. That is, SZ, is analogous 
to error variance in the analysis of variance. The scatter index for the 
entire collection of forecasts, over all intervals, is simply the sum of those 
for the individual indexes: 
K 
sz = c sz, 
k=l 
(10) 
As indicated in the scatter section of Table 1, there was statistically 
reliably less scatter in the undergraduate subjects’ forecasts than in those 
of the graduate subjects. Thus, this appears to be the immediate basis for 
the overall superior accuracy of the undergraduates’ predictions. 
Forecast profile variance. Why were the graduate subjects’ forecasts 
plagued by more scatter than were the undergraduates’ predictions? Ac- 
cording to the hypothesis described in the introduction, graduate subjects 
should be expected to vary their forecasts in response to cues their pre- 
vious instruction and practical experience suggested to be predictive of 
actual price changes. Undergraduate subjects should be less likely to do 
this, because they have had less instruction and experience and recognize 
the limits of their knowledge. The graduate subjects’ strategy would be 
detrimental if they responded to irrelevant cues or if they did rely on 
relevant cues, but improperly. The observed difference in scatter is con- 
sistent with the proposed hypothesis. Further evidence is provided by 
examining the “profiles” of the subjects’ forecasts across all six of the 
price change intervals that were specified. 
Recall that, for any given stock, a uniform forecaster would make the 
following collection of forecasts for price changes in the respective inter- 
vals: 
f = (.167, .167, .167, .167, .167, .167) 
That is, the profile of forecasts is “flat,” with forecasts exhibiting no 
variability from interval to interval. The current hypothesis implies that 
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the undergraduates’ forecast profiles should more closely resemble that of 
a uniform forecaster than should those of the graduate subjects. This in 
turn implies that the across-interval variances of those forecasts should be 
smaller for the undergraduates. The profile variance section of Table 1 
shows that this in fact was the case. Stael von Holstein (1972, p. 151) 
noticed a similar tendency for his more accurate subjects to report more 
uniform forecasts. 
Additional, indirect evidence compatible with the proposed hypothesis 
is contained in Table 2. Only one of the self-reported background vari- 
ables had consistently high correlations with most of the price forecast 
accuracy measures: the number of finance classes taken by the subject. 
Observe in the correlation matrix shown in Table 2(a) that scatter, profile 
variance, and PSM all increased with the number of classes the subject 
had taken. Also note that profile variance was almost perfectly correlated 
with scatter and PSM. So, graduate subjects not only eschewed uniform 
forecasts, varying their judgments from one interval to the next. They 
also varied those nonuniform forecasts from one stock to another, but in 
a manner largely unrelated to actual stock prices. Table 2 shows that the 
number of classes was inversely related to the mean slope. It is as if 
classroom experience inspired the subjects to try their hands at various 
prediction strategies, but that either the strategies were “backwards” or 
the subjects’ application of them was. 
Earnings 
The previously noted characteristics of subjects’ price forecasts were 
completely paralleled in their earnings forecasts. Thus, as shown in Fig. 
3(a), the mean earnings forecast patterns of the undergraduate subjects 
were very similar to those of the graduate subjects, but the patterns of 
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FIG. 3. (a) Mean earnings change forecasts for a uniform forecaster (v), a historical 
forecaster (H), a base rate forecaster (B), and the undergraduate (UC) and graduate (CR) 
subjects; (b) probability scores (psM) for uniform, historical, and base rate forecasters as 
standards and for the undergraduate and graduate subjects. 
ical and base rate earnings forecasters. Also, as indicated in Fig. 3(b), the 
overall accuracy of subjects’ earnings forecasts was significantly inferior 
to that of uniform, historical, and base rate forecasters. Further, as shown 
in Table 1, the undergraduates’ earnings forecasts were- more accurate 
than those of the graduate students. This difference apparently was due to 
the tendency of graduate subjects to vary their forecasts in such a way 
that they resulted in greater scatter. 
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Prices vs Earnings 
Table 1 includes comparisons of various accuracy measures for price 
and earnings forecasts, along with the results discussed previously. In the 
PSM section we see that, as anticipated, the overall accuracy of the 
earnings forecasts was superior to that of the price forecasts, but only for 
the undergraduate subjects. Overall accuracy comparisons of price and 
earnings forecasts would be “unfair” if the base rates for prices and 
earnings were different. This is because, as indicated previously, PSM is 
affected by the base rates despite the fact that the forecaster has no 
control over those rates. As the solid bars in Figs. 2(a) and 3(a) indicate, 
the base rates for prices and earnings actually did differ. 
Decompositions of PSM imply that it can be “corrected” by removing 
the contributions of the base rates (Yates, 1988). This results in what can 
be called a forecasting “skill index,” 
K 
Skill Index = PSM - c Var(&), 
k=I 
(11) 
which is, in fact, affected mainly by factors under the forecaster’s control. 
As a virtual statistical necessity, given the previous analyses, Table 1 
indicates that the skill indexes of undergraduate subjects’ price and eam- 
ings forecasts were superior, i.e., lower, than the corresponding indexes 
for their graduate counterparts. Of more immediate significance, how- 
ever, it is shown that both undergraduates and graduates exhibited greater 
skill at forecasting earnings rather than prices. Precisely how did the 
accuracy of earnings forecasts surpass that of price forecasts? Table 1 
indicates that the major determinant of this superiority was the better 
calibration of the earnings forecasts. In view of the determinants of earn- 
ings as compared to prices, it is surprising that the observed differences 
in slope and scatter were weak and inconsistent. 
Do individuals display a significant degree of consistency in their fore- 
casting tendencies in the separate domains of prices and earnings (cf. 
Ronis 8z Yates, 1987)? The correlations in Table 3 suggest that, in most 
respects, they do. Subjects who made superior earnings forecasts tended 
to make better price predictions, too. Similar conclusions apply to cali- 
bration and scatter tendencies also, but not slope. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Consistent with StaCl von Holstein’s (1972) findings, and under condi- 
tions somewhat closer to naturalistic ones, subjects’ probabilistic fore- 
casts of stock prices were shown to be surprisingly inaccurate. As ex- 
pected, predictions of company earnings were better, though still not very 
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TABLE 3 
PRICE vs EARNINGS CORRELATIONS (r), WITH SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS @), 
FOR VARIOUS Accua~cv MEASURES 
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.?4 <.005 .92 C.001 
.25 ns 49 ns 
accurate in an absolute sense. This difference was achieved via better 
calibration for the earnings forecasts. Also in agreement with conclusions 
suggested by Stael von Holstein’s group comparisons, undergraduates’ 
predictions were more accurate-actually, less inaccurate-than those of 
graduate students. Detailed analyses indicated that the undergraduates’ 
relative advantage was due to their forecasts containing less variability 
that was independent of actual price and earnings activity. In turn, this 
was at least partly explained by the closer resemblance of their judgments 
to those of a uniform forecaster. 
There are, of course, numerous caveats that preclude any sweeping 
conclusions that might be drawn from the present study. One is that the 
subjects were only students rather than practicing finance professionals 
(although most of the graduate subjects in fact did possess some profes- 
sional experience). Moreover, forecasts were made for only a single ti- 
nancial quarter. Nevertheless, the results at least suggest several hypoth- 
eses that should be pursued in future work. 
Some previous research on expertise has emphasized that experts’ rep- 
resentations of problem situations tend to be more abstract than novices’ 
representations, being built around underlying principles rather than sur- 
face features of the stimuli (e.g., Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). Several 
of these studies have shown how such representational differences can 
sometimes lead to novices outperforming experts (e.g., Adelson, 1984; 
Chase & Simon, 1973). These anomalies occur because the experts are 
induced to try to apply their normally more effective representational 
structures to situations in which they are actually inappropriate, e.g., 
when a chess master is asked to memorize a chess board configuration 
that he is told comes from a real chess game but is actually randomly 
generated. 
The superior performance of the less experienced subjects in the 
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present study does not appear to have its basis in the abstract vs concrete 
distinction. Instead, it seems grounded in another phenomenon that is 
sometimes noted in expertise research, that experts’ representations are 
richer than those of novices (e.g., Murphy & Wright, 1984). In particular, 
recall that the forecasts of our presumed semi-experts, i.e., graduate stu- 
dent subjects, were more responsive to various differences among target 
companies than were the predictions of our novices, i.e., undergraduate 
subjects. Besides simply providing another illustration, the present re- 
sults also highlight two hazards of the enrichment phenomenon. These 
hazards implicitly have been acknowledged in the judgment literature, but 
not in most previous expertise research. 
As a person acquires more experience within a domain, he or she also 
forms more beliefs about which cues are predictive of the relevant target 
events. In “simple” natural systems, false beliefs are relatively easily 
corrected via feedback, as illustrated by the fact that most children are 
rapidly disabused of many of their misconceptions about mechanics (see, 
for example, Kaiser & Proffttt, 1984). But in more complex systems, such 
as those encountered in medicine and business, focal events are so over- 
determined by multiple causes that it is virtually impossible for a person 
to rely on unaided observation to correct his or her erroneous beliefs. 
Accordingly, weak cues can continue indefinitely to be added to those 
that affect judgments, e.g., stock price forecasts. The result is that, al- 
though we might expect that greater experience will lead to demonstrably 
greater accuracy, it instead simply results in more useless variation in 
judgments, e.g., scatter (cf. Gaeth & Shanteau, 1984; Poses et al., 1985). 
Even if the cues that are gradually added to the pool considered by a 
judge are valid, this does not guarantee that they will enhance the judge’s 
performance. Lens model research (e.g., Dudycha & Naylor, 1966) indi- 
cates that the addition of such cues can be detrimental in two ways. First, 
the accuracy of judgments can decline because the judge misuses the 
additional cues. Second, the new cues make the judgment task more 
difftcult, and hence diminish the judge’s reliability. 
One of our referees was skeptical about the prediction that semi- 
experts’ forecasts would exhibit greater scatter because those individuals 
would take more cues into account than would novices. It was suggested 
that a reasonable alternative prediction is that attending to more cues 
would produce less scatter. The argument is as follows: Suppose any 
judge effectively averages the values of all the cues that he or she uses. In 
terms of Figs. l(a) and l(b), it is as if, intervening between the individual 
cues and the process by which the person generates a judgment, those 
individual cues are reduced to a composite, average cue. Then, because 
of the phenomena described in such principles as the central limit theo- 
rem, the composite cues based on large numbers of cues should be less 
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variable than those that synthesize fewer ones. The present results argue 
against such a process, or at least such a process being executed very 
well. Instead, it appears that, for judges at the expertise level of our 
subjects, trying to cope with additional cues is overwhelming. 
In everyday practice within the financial community, probabilistic fore- 
casts are virtually unknown. Instead, predictions typically are reported as 
point estimates or unqualified forecasts of ranges. For instance, an ana- 
lyst will simply assert that “Company X will earn $1.03 per share during 
the third quarter” or that “Company Y’s earnings for this year should be 
between $3.50 and $3.80.” Thus, it is difficult to make direct comparisons 
between the present results and those found in most previous studies of 
financial forecasting. However, parallels do exist, and some of the 
present conclusions can be expected to generalize. Moreover, a good case 
can be made that, although probabilistic forecasts are not routinely used 
in the financial world, they should be. At a minimum, they would allow 
the consumer of financial forecasts to know, for example, how firmly an 
analyst holds his or her expectation that Company Y’s earnings will be in 
the $3.50-$3.80 range. Going even further, an investor could incorporate 
the analyst’s probability judgments into financial decision making algo- 
rithms similar to those used in decision analysis. 
In the present study, as in Stael von Holstein’s (1972), subjects’ prob- 
abilistic forecasts were worse than those of a uniform forecaster. This 
necessarily implies that they were also worse than those of a historical 
forecaster. There is evidence that professional forecasters’ point esti- 
mates of earnings sometimes are more accurate than estimates generated 
by statistical models that rely on historical data. However, such advan- 
tages are far from universal (Armstrong, 1983). Thus, the present results 
do not seem at odds with “mainstream” findings on the accuracy of 
deterministic, i.e., nonprobabilistic, financial forecasts. This conclusion 
is more directly supported by an examination of professional forecasters’ 
predictions for the cases used in this study. Every month, the “Institu- 
tional Brokerage Estimate System” publishes averages of leading profes- 
sional analysts’ forecasts of various statistics about securities. The Jan- 
uary 16, 1986, report (which was, incidentally, readily available to our 
subjects) included the first quarter 1986 earnings forecasts for the 31 
companies included in our study. The correlation of .22 between the 
consensus forecasts and the eventual actual earnings was positive but 
modest. 
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